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NOTES AND COMMENT
tax laws as applied to an illegal occupation. It has been cogently
contended, moreover, that the fear of conviction for failure to file an
income tax return would not impel a criminal to disclose the sources
of his illegal earnings,' 6 no more than the fear of conviction for "boot-
legging" influences a criminal from forsaking such an employment.
On the other hand, it may be maintained in consonance with
the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, that there is no sound reason why
an individual should refrain from making an income tax report simply
because he was satisfied in the conviction that in so doing he might
incriminate himself. In other words, an individual is not to assume
functions of the court in determining whether or not the matter
would accuse him.'17 The possibility readily suggests itself, too, that
to hold otherwise would tend to foster crime in offering an attractive
refuge to lawbreakers.' s
The border line cases in the application of the provisions of the
Fifth Amendment will probably be decided according as the judges
approve or disapprove of the policy embodied in the guaranty as
applied to tax returns.
V. j. M.
QUASI-PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY: MARTIN V. PEYTON - "Much
ancient learning as to partnership is obsolete." ' With these words,
the New York Court of Appeals begins its most recent decision upon
the question of when persons, not ostensibly partners, may be sub-
jected to liability for partnership obligations.
A hundred and fifty years ago, the English Court of Common
Pleas, in the case of Grace v. Smith,2 said, "Every man who has a
share of the profits of a trade ought also to bear his share of the
loss. And if any one takes part of the profit, he takes part of that
fund on which the creditor of the trader relies for his payment." 3
Under the rule of this case, as promulgated by the English courts,
the right to share profits was decisive of partnership liability. The
" United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450 (1921).
1727 Columbia Law Rev. 467 (1927); Application of rule against
Self Incrimination to Income Tax Returns.
" Mason, et al., v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 (1917).
'Martin v. Peyton, et al., 246 N. Y. 213, 217, 158 N. E. 77 (1927).
'2 W. B1. 998 (C. P. 1775).
3 Ibid. 1000.
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intention of the parties not to assume the obligations incident to the
partnership relation was generally disregarded.
4
It was not until 1860 that the stringency of this rule was relaxed.
This was accomplished by the decision of the House of Lords in the
now historic case of Cox and Wheatcroft v. Hickman.5 In delivering
what has been recognized as the prevailing opinion, Lord Cranworth
said, with regard to the rule of Grace v. Smith and Waugh v. Carver,6
"This, no doubt, is in general a sufficiently accurate test; for a right
to participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive, evidence that
the trade in which the profits have been made was carried on in part
for or on behalf of the person setting up such a claim. But the real
ground of the liability is that the trade has been carried on by persons
acting on his behalf. When that is the case, he is liable to the trade
obligations and entitled to its profits, or a share of them." 7
The United States Supreme Court, though not approving the
method of reasoning by which the English Court reached its conclu-
sion, favored the general relaxation.8  As a rule better suited for
common application, Mr. Justice Gray suggested, "That those persons
are partners who contribute either property or money to carry on a
joint business for their common benefit, and who own and share the
profits thereof in certain proportions." 9 In rejecting the contention
'See Waugh v. Carver, Carver and Geisler, 2 H. B1. 235, 246 (C. P.
1793), "it is plain upon the construction of the agreement, if it be con-
strued only between the Carvers and Geisler, that they were not nor
ever meant to be partners," yet the defendants were held answerable for
a trade obligation incurred by one of them. For a discussion of the
earlier English rule and its application, see the opinion of Blackburn, J.,
in Bullen v. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. Cases 86 (1865).
'8 H. L. Cas. 268 (1860).
'Supra, Note 4.
'Cox v. Hickman, supra, note 5, at 306. Though, of the ten reported
opinions, Lord Cranworth's has been generally regarded as the true ex-
pression of the views of the Court, it is interesting to note that Lord
Chief Baron Pollock believed the law to be as set forth in Story, Partn.
§ 49. "In short, the true rule, ex aequo et bono, would seem to be, that
the agreement and intention of the parties themselves should govern all
the cases, if they intended a partnership in the capital stock, or in the
profits, or in both; then, that the same rule should apply in favour of
third persons, even if the agreement were unknown to them; and on the
other hand, if no such partnership were intended between the parties,
then that there should be none as to third parties * * *'"8 Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611, 12 Sup. Ct. 972. (1892.) In
Berthold, et al. v. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536, 542, decided at December
term, 1860, the Supreme Court had prepared the way for Meehan v.
Valentine.
'Meehan v. Valentine, supra, note 8, at 623.
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of the plaintiff that the receipt of a contingent share of the profits
of a firm as compensation for a loan constituted the lender a partner
as to third parties, the Court, while speaking of acts which one might
perform without involving oneself in partnership liability, said, "And
it is now equally well settled that the receiving of part of the profits
of a commercial partnership, in lieu of or in addition to interest, by
way of compensation for a loan of money, has of itself no greater
effect (citing cases)." 'o The decision in Cox v. Hickman met with
the general approval of courts elsewhere. 1"
The courts of New York, however, did not consider themselves
bound by that decision, and in the leading case of Leggett v. Hyde,' 2
which, nominally at least, remained the law of this jurisdiction until
the adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act, the Court cited with
approval the earlier English cases. In its opinion, the Court expressly
negatived the efficacy of the parties' intention not to become partners'2
and in explanation said, "Among the reasons given is this, whether
it be strong or weak, that whatever person shares in the profit of any
concern shall be liable to creditors for losses also, since he takes a
part of the fund, which in great measure is the creditors' security
for the payment of the debts to them." 14 The Court, though evidently
not satisfied with the reason assigned for the earlier rule of law, was
of opinion that a change to conform to the needs of commerce could
only be effected by legislative enactment. In subsequent decisions, the
New York courts, though carefully reiterating the rule of Leggett v.
Hyde, 15 limited its application. 16
"0 Ibid. 624.
'In the opinions in Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep.
192 (1873), reference is had to the leading decisions upon the question.
See also the opinions in Thillman v. Benton, 82 Md. 64, 33 Atl. 485
(1895); Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Neil, et al., 62 N. J. L. 462, 41 Atl. 834
(1898); Jackson v. Haynie's Admr., 106 Va. 382, 56 S. E. 148 (1907).
"58 N. Y. 272 (1874).
"Ibid 278.
"Ibid.
'A rather forceful reiteration is found in Hackett v. Stanley, 115 N. Y.
625, 22 N. E. 745 (1889), "The application of the rule that 'participation
in profits' renders their recipient a partner in the business from which
profits are derived, as to third persons, has been somewhat restricted by
modern decisions; but we think that the division of profits must still be
considered the most important element in all contracts by which the true
relation of parties to a business is to be determined. We think this rule
is founded in strict justice and sound policy."
"King v. Sarria, 69 N. Y. 24, 35, 36, (1877); Smith v. Bodine, 74
N. Y. 30, 33 (1878); Richardson v. Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55 (1879); Curry z'.
Fowler, 87 N. Y. 33 (1881); Cassidy v. Hall, 97 N. Y. 159 (1884);
Burnett v. Snyder, 81 N. Y. 550, 555 (1880), "It is not every participation
in the profits which will make one a partner. Numerous exceptions to the
rule have been established."
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The adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act 17 permitted our
courts to follow the dictates of commercial necessity. The Act defines
a partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners a business for profit," i" and provides statutory tests for
determining its existence?19 Contained in the Act is a direction that
its provisions, though in derogation of the common law, be liberally
construed.2 0  Since the adoption of this uniform law, which has been
enacted in sixteen states, including those of prime commercial import-
ance,2 1 the courts have denied the existence of partnership liability
under circumstances which would have called for a contrary decision
but a decade ago.2
2
In the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of
Martin v. Peyton, et al.,23 we find the widest departure from the
rules as previously enunciated. In this case, a long established bank-
ing firm in New York City had suffered financial reverses during the
period of post-war deflation. The value of its working capital, con-
sisting largely of inactive and foreign securities, had been seriously
depleted, and in order to continue its business it was imperative that
these securities be supplanted by a large amount of readily marketable
securities. A member of the firm, through his intimacy with certain
of the defendants, was enabled to negotiate a loan of $2,500,000 in
desirable securities, the property of persons represented by those de-
fendants. By the terms of the parties' agreement the inactive securi-
ties of the firm were mortgaged to two of the defendants for the
benefit of themselves and their co-lenders. As compensation for the
loan of the active securities, the lenders were to be entitled to agreed
shares of the profits. Two of their number, described as trustees,
were to be consulted in all matters of importance and were empowered
to prohibit the firm's participation in ventures which they might deem
speculative. The interest of each member in the firm was assigned
to the trustees and the signed resignation of each member was de-
posited as further security. An "option agreement" giving the
lenders, or any of them, the right to enter the firm upon compliance
with certain conditions also formed part of the transaction.
"Laws of 1919, Chap. 408, constituting Chap. 39 of the Consolidated
Laws.
'U. P. A. § 6-1; N. Y. Part L. § 10-1.
" Ibid. § 7; § 11.
'Ibid. § 4; § 4.
'E.g., Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York and Pennsylvania.
"E.g., In re Hoyne, 277 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922) where the
decision turned upon U. P. A. § 7, as enacted in Illinois.
-246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E. 77 (1927).
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After the effort to forestall bankruptcy had proven unsuccessful,
plaintiff sought to enforce a partnership obligation against the lenders.
The Court, in holding them not liable, was of opinion that the lenders
did not exercise primary control over the acts of the partnership. The
control conferred upon the so-called trustees was found to be fully
consonant with a desire on the part of the lenders to protect their loan
and was not considered indicative of an assumption of the partnership
relation.
It is interesting to note that the Court in its opinion relied solely
upon two sections of the Partnership Law 24 as expressive of the law
of this state. The case of Cox v. Hickman and the leading English
cases in conformity therewith, together with decisions of the federal
courts and of state courts of other jurisdictions formed the basis of
this opinion. The instant case, however, goes further than any of
those cited. Here the loan arrangement was not made in the interest
of existing creditors who sought thereby to increase the amounts
recoverable by them (as was the case in two of the three federal
decisions cited),25 but rather for the benefit of persons, previously
unconcerned in the firm's affairs, who were investing new capital
presumably in the hope of substantial profit. It is also interesting to
note that the property supplied by the lenders constituted, from the
time of the loan until the bankruptcy, the entire working capital of
the firm. Since no question of liability by estoppel was presented in
this case, it was the decision of the Court, that, despite the circum-
stances above mentioned, the intention of the parties not to constitute
themselves partners should prevail.
This decision completely abrogates the rule formerly obtaining in
New York, that, as to third parties, one not actually a partner could
be held answerable for firm obligations upon proof that he shared, or
bad a right to share, in the profits of the business. With the excep-
tion of liability by estoppel, we can say, in the words of the Court,
that "today only those who are partners between themselves may be
charged for partnership debts by others." 26
H. G. H.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR FRAUD: FAILURE TO PARTICIPATE IN A
RELIGIOUS CEREMONY.-The law governing annulment of marriage for
fraud has been thrown into confusion by the recent decision of the
24N. Y. Part L. §§ 10, 11.
Giles v. Vette, 263 U. S. 553, 44 Sup. Ct. 157 (1924); In re Hoyne,
supra, note 22.
'Martin v. Peyton, supra, note 23, at 223, 158 N. E. at 80.
